Rethinking Trademark Functionality as a Question of Fact by Liebesman, Yvette Joy
Saint Louis University School of Law
Scholarship Commons
All Faculty Scholarship
2014
Rethinking Trademark Functionality as a Question
of Fact
Yvette Joy Liebesman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the
Intellectual Property Law Commons
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2566575 
 
202 
RETHINKING TRADEMARK 
FUNCTIONALITY 
AS A QUESTION OF FACT 
Yvette Joy Liebesman* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................  203 
 I. WHAT’S YOUR FUNCTION? .................................................................  206 
 A. Looking Distinctive .....................................................................  207 
 B. The Essence of Use and Beauty ..................................................  208 
 1. Utilitarian functionality ........................................................  210 
 2. Aesthetic functionality ..........................................................  212 
 C. Burden of Proof ..........................................................................  213 
 II. QUESTIONING FACT FINDING..............................................................  214 
 A. A Finding of Fact ........................................................................  215 
 B. The Conclusory Restatement and Treatise ..................................  216 
 C. Inwood Labs & Morton-Norwich ................................................  216 
 D. Circuits in Parallel .....................................................................  218 
 III. IT’S PATENTLY OBVIOUS ....................................................................  220 
 A. Relative Obviousness ..................................................................  221 
 B. Functionally Obvious ..................................................................  222 
 C. Factual Inquiries as Issues at Law .............................................  224 
 IV. UNDEVELOPED FUNCTIONALITY ........................................................  225 
 A. Limiting Monopolies ...................................................................  226 
 B. Difficult Instructions, Confused Jurors .......................................  227 
 C. Wrongful Consequences ..............................................................  230 
 V. FUNCTIONALITY AND THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT ............................  231 
FINAL THOUGHTS ...........................................................................................  234 
                                                        
*  Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. Comments from 
Annmarie Bridy, Jennifer Carter-Johnson, Monica Eppinger, Kerrin Kowach, Mark Lemley, 
David Levine, Glynn Lunney, Andrea Matwyshyn, Alexandra Roberts, and Greg Vetter 
were especially helpful. Thanks to Mark McKenna, Lisa Ramsey, Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, 
Bill McGeveran, and David S. Welkowitz for their comments and suggestions on an earlier 
draft. I am also grateful to Kassandra Garrison, Beth Owen, Paul Sileo, Julie Houska, and 
Austin Fitzgerald, for their valuable research assistance. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2566575 
Fall 2014] TRADEMARK FUNCTIONALITY 203 
INTRODUCTION 
The dysfunction of the functionality doctrine has been illustrated in its 
treatment in recent court cases and has been comprehensively examined by 
scholars.1 Problems regarding which substantive test to use, the difference be-
tween utilitarian and aesthetic functionality, and the limited knowledge of the 
jury all plague functionality from becoming a more robust, better understood 
doctrine. Yet, while the focus has continually been on the substantive test, by 
taking a step back, it is obvious that the problem has an even deeper origin. 
There has been a consistent declaration that trade dress functionality is 
treated as a “question of fact,” but—with the exception of a few cursory state-
ments—there has been very little explanation as to why this is so. It is simply 
taken as the way things have always been. Some scholars and jurists may argue 
that there is no need to state a rationale—that a rationale is only required when 
a standard is changed. Yet by failing to provide a rationale, and merely assum-
ing that the determination of functionality results in a “finding of fact” as the 
default “correct” standard to use, there is a missed opportunity to examine and 
ensure that this so-called “default” is indeed correct. As discussed in this arti-
cle, this assumption may in fact be wrong. 
The choice of audience—that is, who determines functionality—has a cas-
cading effect. Whether it is decided by the court or by a jury affects any later 
determination of infringement, “which in turn influences the sorts of works that 
third parties are willing to produce without risking liability. Choice of audience 
thus collectively shapes the available body of works, products, and brands.”2 
Trademark law (which encompasses trade dress) looks to protect a mark 
owner’s reputational advantage.3 By establishing goodwill, a manufacturer can 
distinguish his or her goods or services from the competition and build brand 
equity. Courts have consistently held, however, that protection for marks or 
distinctive features has never been intended to confer a monopolistic,4 anti-
                                                        
1  See, e.g., Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 505–
06 (6th Cir. 2013); Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823, 823–24 
(2011). 
2  Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 
112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1253 (2014). 
3  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (“[T]rademark law . . . 
seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm’s reputation.”); see also Antioch Co. v. 
W. Trimming Corp., Nos. 98-3876, 98-3943, 1999 WL 777556, at *10 n.3 (6th Cir. Sept. 16, 
1999) (“A product . . . is . . . deserving of trade dress protection, if consumers identify the 
product, because of its distinctive design, with the reputation of the product’s source and for 
that reason are more inclined to purchase it.”). 
4  Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164–65 (“It is the province of patent law, not trademark law, to en-
courage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions 
for a limited time, after which competitors are free to use the innovation. If a product’s func-
tional features could be used as trademarks, however, a monopoly over such features could 
be obtained without regard to whether they qualify as patents and could be extended forev-
er.” (citations omitted)). 
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competitive, or non-reputational advantage over competitors.5 Yet, determining 
whether a product’s feature identifies source, or is merely ornamental or func-
tional—in which case the protection of the feature as trade dress would confer 
a non-reputational advantage—has long been muddled in a confusing quagmire 
of court decisions and unclear doctrines.6 
Trade dress scholarship has addressed important difficulties with the func-
tionality doctrine, such as courts’ reliance on the dubious “competitive need” of 
a feature in assessing functionality,7 the overall ambiguity of the doctrine,8 and 
the question of whether functionality should even be a complete bar to trade 
dress protection.9 Nevertheless, another vitally important, yet previously undis-
cussed, concern related to this determination is the standard by which function-
ality should be assessed. In adjudicating a trade dress infringement claim, 
courts have traditionally and uniformly declared that the question of functional-
ity is determined as a finding of fact. However, no court or legal scholar has 
ever thoroughly examined whether there is any foundational basis for this in 
the U.S. Constitution, or if there are any policy reasons for using a purely fac-
tual determination, rather than making an evidentiary conclusion at law based 
on the underlying facts,10 similar to the standard currently used for determining 
patent non-obviousness.11 How courts ascertain functionality (or non-
functionality) dictates whether the issue is to be decided by a judge or whether 
the defendant has the option of having a jury be the finder of fact,12 and deter-
mines the standard of review on appeal.13 Indeed, changing how courts treat the 
                                                        
5  Id. at 165 (“ ‘[I]n general terms, a product feature is functional,’ and cannot serve as a 
trademark . . . if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant non-
reputation-related disadvantage.”). 
6  See infra notes 83–107 and accompanying text. 
7  See McKenna, supra note 1, at 830–31 & n.35. 
8  See, e.g., Brett Ira Johnson, Trade Dress Functionality: A Doctrine in Need of Clarifica-
tion, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 125, 139 (2011). 
9  Jessica Litman, Note, The Problem of Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement 
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 77, 78 (1982); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1052(e)(5) (2012). 
10  See infra notes 83–107 and accompanying text. 
11  In re Arora, 369 F. App’x 120, 121 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The determination of obviousness 
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is a legal conclusion based on underlying facts.” (citing In re Kumar, 
418 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005))). 
12  U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment provides that “In Suits at common law 
. . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law.” 
13  Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evi-
dence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due 
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”), with Carco Grp., 
Inc. v. Maconachy, 718 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Following a bench trial, we review a 
district court’s findings of fact for clear error, and its conclusions of law de novo.”). 
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question of functionality could even lead to clarifying the substantive matters 
in the doctrine itself. 
It might be pondered whether the standard matters—well, it does for two 
reasons. First it is important to get it right for its own sake. Second, using the 
correct standard is an essential part of the overall solution to the problems 
plaguing the functionality doctrine. As such, this article does not focus on the 
actual tests used to determine functionality—many fine scholars have already 
researched and written on this subject.14 Rather, this article is concerned with 
the evidentiary standard by which these tests are examined. The author argues 
that courts have been incorrectly making a functionality determination as a 
finding of fact when there are stronger public policy and constitutional reasons 
for treating trade dress functionality as legal conclusion. 
This article first argues that, since the question of functionality is whether 
the feature at issue should be under the purview of patent law (either as a utility 
or design patent), which is a constitutional question, it follows that the more 
appropriate approach would be to treat functionality as an evidentiary conclu-
sion at law (such as that used for determining patent obviousness). Second, it 
will allow for the development of a more robust doctrine because the court 
would have to explain its rationale on the record. In functionality’s current 
treatment as a question of fact, because typical jury instructions merely require 
a “yes” or “no” response to functionality, the jury’s reasons—if any—are con-
signed to the machinations of the jury room, forever hidden from public view. 
This would change with a transformation in its treatment standard, and aid fu-
ture decision-makers faced with the same query. 
To support this article’s assertion that courts should change the standard by 
which functionality is determined, Part I provides the basic requirements for a 
product’s design to serve as its trade dress. This section also explains the func-
tionality doctrine and then briefly describes the tests for both utilitarian and 
aesthetic non-functionality. Part II dissects the current rationale of non-
functionality determination as an issue of fact by the courts. Part III addresses 
the constitutional angle of this ’author’s argument—that what courts are really 
trying to resolve with the question of functionality is whether this feature is 
something that should be governed by patent law, a constitutional standard. 
Part IV presents the public policy perspective in support of a fact-based legal 
conclusion as the proper standard for determining functionality and explains 
how juries are poorly equipped to make a factual determination of non-
functionality and wholly unable to advance the court’s doctrine. This article 
                                                        
14  See, e.g., Litman, supra note 9, at 77–78; McKenna, supra note 1; Allison Midei, Getting 
to Functional: Limiting the Applicability of the Trademark Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine, 
41 AIPLA Q.J. 467, 469 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2243894; A. Samuel Oddi, The Functions of “Functionality” in Trademark 
Law, 22 HOUS. L. REV. 925, 925 (1985); Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trade-
mark Law’s Functionality Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. REV. 243, 244–47 (2004). 
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concludes that a shift in the standard for determining functionality of trade 
dress would benefit competitors and consumers and bring the standard in line 
with the source of the inquiry based in patent law. 
I. WHAT’S YOUR FUNCTION? 
Conjunction Junction, what’s your function? 
Hooking up cars and making ’em function.15 
 
It is undisputed that “trade dress can be protected under federal law.”16 The 
United States Patent and Trademark Office will register a trade dress as a mark 
because it “constitutes a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’ within the meaning of [Section] 2 
of the Trademark Act.”17 However, registration is not required for a product’s 
features to have trade dress protection under the Lanham Act.18 
For a product feature to receive protection under the Lanham Act,19 two 
key requirements are that a product’s trade dress must be distinctive20 and non-
functional.21 Distinctiveness, either inherent or acquired, means that the sym-
bols, words, shape, or other feature indicates the source of the goods.22 A trade 
dress is non-functional when it is neither useful nor is the aesthetically pleasing 
                                                        
15  Schoolhouse Rock: Conjunction Junction, lyrics by Bob Dorough (1973), available at 
http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/grammarrock.htm#conjunctions. 
16  TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 (2001). 
17  TMEP § 1202.02 (October 2014); see also Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. 
Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 503 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Trade dress refers to the image and 
overall appearance of a product. It embodies that arrangement of identifying characteristics 
or decorations connected with a product, whether by packaging or otherwise, that makes the 
source of the product distinguishable from another and promotes its sale.” (quoting Aber-
crombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 629 (6th Cir. 
2002))). 
18  Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[R]egistration is not a 
requirement for protection under the Lanham Act.”); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 
624 F.2d 366, 372 (1st Cir. 1980) (“[S]ection 43(a) of the Lanham Act creates a federal law 
of unfair competition by providing a statutory remedy to a party aggrieved by a competitor’s 
‘false designation of origin’ of his product, even though he does not have a federally regis-
tered trademark.”). 
19  15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012). 
20  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 207 (2000). 
21  MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW 65 (2d ed. 2009); see also Wal-
Mart, 529 U.S. at 214. Under the Lanham Act, registration also will not be granted to marks 
that are, for example, found to be immoral, scandalous, deceptive, or likely to cause confu-
sion with an existing mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), (d). 
22  Fabrication Enters. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1995) (“A product’s ‘trade 
dress,’ which involves the ‘total image of a product and may include features such as size, 
shape, color or color combinations, texture [or] graphics,’ . . . may be protectable under the 
Lanham Act.” (citations omitted) (quoting Le Sportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 
75 (2d Cir. 1985))). 
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nature of the object the reason for the purchase.23 This section will focus on 
these two basic requirements for a product’s design to function as trade dress. 
A. Looking Distinctive 
Trade dress “refers to the appearance of a product when that appearance is 
used to identify the producer.”24 For example, we recognize the distinctive 
shape of the Coca-Cola bottle and the pale pink of Mary Kay cosmetic prod-
ucts. Christian Louboutin shoes are recognized by their distinctive red soles.25 
The feature is “used in such a way that its primary significance in the minds of 
the prospective consumers is not the product itself, but the identification of the 
product with a single source, regardless of whether consumers know who or 
what that source is.”26 For physical features to serve as a mark: 
[T]he appearance must be distinctive by reason of the shape or color or texture 
or other visible or otherwise palpable feature of the product or its packaging. If 
it isn’t distinctive, it won’t be associated in the mind of the consumer with a 
specific producer. If it is distinctive, and if as a result it comes to identify the 
producer, the danger arises that the duplication of this appearance, this “trade 
dress,” by a competing seller will confuse the consumer regarding the origin of 
the product; the consumer may think it the product of the producer whose trade 
dress was copied.27 
Thus, it is in this way that, “[t]rade dress . . . serves the same function as 
trademark, and is treated the same way by the Lanham Act and the cases inter-
preting it.”28 Indeed, trade dress protection is derived from Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, which “provides protection against deceptive marking, packag-
ing, and advertising of goods or services in commerce, whether or not a regis-
tered trademark is involved.”29 Thus, trade dress protects the features of a 
product’s packaging or the design of the product itself30 that are a source indi-
cator.31 “[T]rade dress includes the design of a product (i.e., the product shape 
                                                        
23  See infra, Part I.B. 
24  Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 338 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Dippin’ 
Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distrib., LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1202 (11th Cir. 2004) (“ ‘Trade 
dress’ involves the total image of a product and may include features such as size, shape, 
color . . . , texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986))). 
25  Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 212 (2d 
Cir. 2012). 
26  Final Jury Instructions at 83, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 
2011 WL 7036077 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2012), 2012 WL 3568795. 
27  Publ’ns Int’l, 164 F.3d at 338. 
28  Id. 
29  Litman, supra note 9, at 79 (footnotes omitted). 
30   LAFRANCE, supra note 21, at 64. 
31  See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 (2001) (“It is well es-
tablished that trade dress can be protected under federal law. The design or packaging of a 
product may acquire a distinctiveness which serves to identify the product with its manufac-
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or configuration), the packaging in which a product is sold (i.e., the ‘dressing’ 
of a product), the color of a product or of the packaging in which a product is 
sold, and the flavor of a product.”32 
While trade dress product packaging can be inherently distinctive,33 prod-
uct design requires secondary meaning.34 “[A] design or package which ac-
quires this secondary meaning . . . is a trade dress which may not be used in a 
manner likely to cause confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of 
the goods.”35 The Lanham Act, however, does not allow the functional features 
of an object to be used as a source indicator.36 And, 
“a product feature is functional,” and cannot serve as a trademark, “if it is essen-
tial to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the ar-
ticle,” that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a signifi-
cant non-reputation-related disadvantage.37 
This statement, reiterated by the Supreme Court in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. 
Marketing Displays, Inc.,38 echoes the two forms of functionality: the utilitari-
an and aesthetic features of a product.39 
B. The Essence of Use and Beauty 
If functionality could be described in two words, they would be “useful-
ness” and “beauty.” The Seventh Circuit analogized the former to wine, which 
“is sold corked. The cork is a functional feature of the product, because it ena-
                                                                                                                                
turer or source; and a design or package which acquires this secondary meaning, assuming 
other requisites are met, is a trade dress which may not be used in a manner likely to cause 
confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the goods.”). 
32  TMEP § 1202.02 (October 2014). 
33  See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1992) (“We agree with the 
Court of Appeals that proof of secondary meaning is not required to prevail on a claim under 
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act where the trade dress at issue is inherently distinctive, and ac-
cordingly the judgment of that court is affirmed.”). 
34  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000) (“We hold that, in an 
action for infringement of unregistered trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a prod-
uct’s design is distinctive, and therefore protectible, only upon a showing of secondary 
meaning.”). 
35  TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 28. 
36  15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (“No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be dis-
tinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on 
account of its nature unless it . . . [c]onsists of a mark which . . . comprises any matter that, 
as a whole, is functional.”). 
37  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (quoting Inwood Labs., 
Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)). 
38  TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 28. 
39  See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 217 
(2d Cir. 2012) (“The ‘functionality’ of a mark can be demonstrated by, inter alia, showing 
that the mark has either traditional ‘utilitarian’ functionality or ‘aesthetic’ functionality.”) 
(citing New Colt Holding Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Fla., Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 195, 212 (D. 
Conn. 2004)). 
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bles the wine to age properly; and so the first seller of wine could not claim that 
the cork was his trade dress.”40 We protect functional improvements with pa-
tent and trade secret law; “they cannot be appropriated in the name of trade 
dress even if they are distinctive.”41 For the latter term, “beauty,” the court use-
fully analogized to mink coats, which “are normally sold dyed. The dye does 
not make the coat any warmer, but it makes it more beautiful, and, once again, 
it could not be claimed as trade dress by the first furrier to have hit on the 
idea.”42 
Both trademark43 and copyright law44 prohibit the protection of functional 
or useful components of the works in question—both consider this to be the 
province of patent law.45 Copyright law’s “useful article” doctrine “protects 
originality rather than novelty or invention.”46 In tandem with this, “the func-
tionality doctrine marks the boundaries of trade dress protection.”47 
Now codified in the Lanham Act,48 the functionality doctrine “has as its 
genesis the judicial theory that there exists a fundamental right to compete 
through imitation of a competitor’s product, which right can only be temporari-
ly denied by the patent or copyright laws.”49 The doctrine “prevents trademark 
                                                        
40  Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 339 (7th Cir. 1998). 
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
43  15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2012). 
44  In copyright law, this is known as the “useful article” doctrine. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) 
(“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless 
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). See 
also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 203 n.3 (1954) (“[T]he Copyright Act ‘does not refer to 
articles of manufacture having a utilitarian purpose nor does it provide for a previous exami-
nation by a proper tribunal as to the originality of the matter offered for copyright.’ ” (quot-
ing Stein v. Expert Lamp Co., 188 F.2d 611, 613 (7th Cir. 1951))). 
45  See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1879) (“The description of the art in a book, 
though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the 
art itself. The object of the one is explanation; the object of the other is use. The former may 
be secured by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by letters-
patent.”), see also, e.g., Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 
355 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Protection of functional product features is the province of patent law 
. . . .” (quoting Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 
640 (6th Cir. 2002))). 
46  Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218; see also, Baker, 101 U.S. at 102 (“To give to the author of the 
book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty 
has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the 
province of letters-patent, not of copyright.”). 
47  I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 1998). 
48  “No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods 
of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless 
it . . . [c]onsists of a mark which . . . comprises any matter that, as a whole, is functional.” 15 
U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5). 
49  In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
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law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, 
from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to con-
trol a useful product feature.”50 These are features which are likely to be shared 
by competitors and are unlikely to identify a particular manufacturer.51 “These 
features cannot be appropriated; otherwise, competitors would be prevented 
from duplicating the new product even to the extent permitted by the branches 
of the law of intellectual property that protect innovation rather than designa-
tions of source.”52 Indeed, “product design almost invariably serves purposes 
other than source identification.”53 
Under the Lanham Act,54 a finding of functionality means that the product 
feature in question can never be protected as trade dress—that is, it can never 
act as a monopoly under the guise that it is acting as an indicator of source or 
sponsorship.55 Thus, the non-functionality doctrine’s purpose is to facilitate 
competition by keeping certain useful design features available to all competi-
tors.56 
1. Utilitarian functionality 
As noted supra, courts recognize two forms of functionality: utilitarian and 
aesthetic.57 The many diverse cases58 involving functionality illustrate how 
                                                        
50  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995). 
51  Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distrib., LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1203 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(citing Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 340 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
52  Id. at 1203; see also Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 339 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(“[A] seller should not be allowed to obtain in the name of trade dress a monopoly over the 
elements of a product’s appearance that either are not associated with a particular producer 
or that have value to consumers that is independent of identification. In the lingo of unfair 
competition, elements of the latter type—elements whose value is not merely signification—
are a product’s ‘functional’ features; They [sic] can be either utilitarian in the narrow sense 
of that word, or aesthetic.” (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164–
65 (1995))); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 297–98 (7th Cir. 1998); 
W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338–40, 343 (7th Cir. 1985); Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. 
All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1980) (“[F]unctional features 
which are not the subject of a valid patent or copyright may be imitated with impunity.”). 
53  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000). 
54  15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2012). 
55  See Dippin’ Dots, 369 F.3d at 1203. 
56  Id. at 1202–03. 
57  See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Utilitarian functionality can be either de facto 
or de jure. De facto functionality means that the design of the product has a function. De ju-
re functionality stands for the proposal that a product is in a particular shape because it 
works better in that shape. Textron, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1025 
(Fed. Cir. 1985). These terms have fallen out of favor, as they are associated with the dis-
credited “alternative design” theory of Morton-Norwich. 
58  See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–16 (2007); TrafFix Devices, 
Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29–30 (2001); Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. 
v. Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 504–06 (6th Cir. 2013); Dippin’ Dots, 369 F.3d at 
1202–03; In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1335–36 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
Fall 2014] TRADEMARK FUNCTIONALITY 211 
“[t]he line between functionality and non-functionality is not . . . brightly 
drawn.”59 The leading cases providing substantive considerations for determin-
ing utilitarian functionality are TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, 
Inc.,60 Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories,61 and In re Morton-Norwich 
Products, Inc.62 Under TrafFix Devices, the Supreme Court emphatically states 
that an expired utility patent “is strong evidence that the features therein 
claimed are functional.”63 
Morton-Norwich provides four factors to consider: (1) whether there exists 
“an expired utility patent which disclosed the utilitarian advantage of the de-
sign sought to be registered”; (2) whether the designer touts the utilitarian ad-
vantages of the product through advertising; (3) whether “there are other alter-
natives available”; and (4) whether “a particular design ‘results from a 
comparatively simple or cheap method of manufacturing.’ ”64 However, the “al-
ternative design” theory of Morton-Norwich has rightly fallen out of favor with 
regard to utilitarian functionality. As emphasized by the recent Sixth Circuit 
decision in Groeneveld Transport Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore International, 
Inc.,65 the Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix Devices repudiates the Morton-
Norwich focus on the availability of alternative designs and competitive neces-
sity. The appellate court, in deciding whether a grease-pump design was non-
functional returned to the test set forth in TrafFix Devices and Inwood Labs,66 
holding that: 
TrafFix Devices makes clear that Groeneveld’s argument about the availability 
of alternative grease-pump designs is misguided. The issue is not whether 
Lubecore could have designed a grease pump with a different appearance; the 
issue is whether Groeneveld’s design “is essential to the use or purpose of the 
article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.” In other words, the ques-
tion is whether the overall shape of Groeneveld’s grease pump was substantially 
influenced by functional imperatives or preferences.67 
                                                        
59  Dippin’ Dots, 369 F.3d at 1203 (quoting Epic Metals Corp. v. Souliere, 99 F.3d 1034, 
1039 (11th Cir. 1996)). 
60  TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 29–30. 
61  Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850–51 & n.10 (1982). 
62  Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1339–41. 
63  TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 29. 
64  See New England Butt Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 756 F.2d 874, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(quoting Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1340–41) (emphasis omitted). 
65  Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 506–07 (6th 
Cir. 2013). 
66  Inwood, 456 U.S. at 851 n.10. 
67  Groeneveld, 730 F.3d at 506 (quoting Inwood, 456 U.S. at 850 n.10). 
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But regardless of what test is used, they all seek to answer the same question: 
whether a product feature “is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it 
affects the cost or quality of the article.”68 
2. Aesthetic functionality 
As John Keats poetically observed,  
A thing of beauty is a joy for ever: 
Its loveliness increases; it will never  
Pass into nothingness; but still will keep 
A bower quiet for us, and a sleep 
Full of sweet dreams, and health, and quiet breathing.69 
We are fond of those things that we find attractive. Economically, this trans-
lates to us humans having natural proclivity towards buying goods because we 
like how they look.70 We find them pretty. And we are attracted to these goods 
not only because of who made them, but also because it appeals to our aesthetic 
sensibilities. And we cannot “put competitors at a significant non-reputation-
related disadvantage”71 by allowing the monopolization of attractive features 
that are not source indicators. 
It would be arbitrary as well as puritanical and even philistine to deny that 
one function of modern consumer packaging is to be beautiful, the motivation 
being sometimes a hope that the consumer will infer the quality of the product 
from the beauty of the package and sometimes a hope that the consumer will de-
rive utility (and so be willing to pay more) from the packaging directly, as when 
a consumer displays a shapely bottle of champagne to his dinner guests.72 
Trademark does not protect originality; it only protects source identifiers.73 
Thus, a producer cannot monopolize a shape via trade dress protection when 
the shape does not signify source, but rather would serve to 
prevent his competitors from making their products as visually entrancing as his 
own. . . . [I]f consumers derive a value from the fact that a product looks a cer-
                                                        
68  Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distrib., LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1203 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 32); see also TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 35 
(“Whether a utility patent has expired or there has been no utility patent at all, a product de-
sign which has a particular appearance may be functional because it is ‘essential to the use or 
purpose of the article’ or ‘affects the cost or quality of the article.’ ” (quoting Inwood Labs, 
456 U.S. at 851 n.10)). 
69  JOHN KEATS, ENDYMION, lines 1–5 (1818), available at http://www.bartleby.com/126 
/32.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2014). 
70  For a general discussion on aesthetic functionality, see Christina Farmer, Note, Red in the 
Eye of the Beholder: The Case for Aesthetic Functionality, 28 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 777, 777 
(2013). 
71  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995). 
72  Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 339 (7th Cir. 1998). 
73  See, e.g., id. at 343 (“[T]rademark and trade dress law do not protect originality; they pro-
tect signifiers of source.”). 
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tain way that is distinct from the value of knowing at a glance who made it, then 
it is a nonappropriable feature of the product.74 
A feature may be both distinctive as a source identifier and aesthetically 
pleasing, and determining the reason behind a consumer’s purchase is not al-
ways easy to determine. An aesthetically pleasing product that, over time, es-
tablished secondary meaning, would still not be able to claim rights in that fea-
ture as a mark.75 That holds equally true for a utilitarian feature.76 
Thus, the Supreme Court has made it clear that lower courts are to employ 
different tests for utilitarian versus aesthetic functionality. In TrafFix Devices, 
the Court reaffirmed its holdings in Inwood Labs (utilitarian functionality) and 
Qualitex (aesthetic functionality), that: 
[A] feature is . . . functional when it is essential to the use or purpose of the de-
vice or when it affects the cost or quality of the device. . . . It is proper to inquire 
into a “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage” in cases of esthetic 
functionality, the question involved in Qualitex. Where the design is functional 
under the Inwood formulation there is no need to proceed further to consider if 
there is a competitive necessity for the feature. In Qualitex, by contrast, esthetic 
functionality was the central question, there having been no indication that the 
green-gold color of the laundry press pad had any bearing on the use or purpose 
of the product or its cost or quality.77 
While the factors and tests used to determine functionality are indeed important 
to the discussion of functionality, they are only tangential to this argument of 
whether the results of any test—whichever test is used—should be considered a 
finding of fact or evidentiary conclusion of law. 
C. Burden of Proof 
In establishing its prima facie case on a claim of trade dress infringement,78 
the plaintiff of a trade dress infringement suit must show that “(1) the product 
design of the two products is confusingly similar; (2) the features of the prod-
                                                        
74  Id. at 339; see also Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distrib., LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1203 
(11th Cir. 2004) (“Under the . . . competitive necessity test . . . generally applied in cases of 
aesthetic functionality, ‘a functional feature is one the exclusive use of [which] would put 
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.’ Where the design is func-
tional under the traditional test, ‘there is no need to proceed further to consider if there is a 
competitive necessity for the feature.’ ” (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, 
Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
75  TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) (declaring that once 
functionality is established, whether a design has acquired secondary meaning need not be 
considered). 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2012); see also Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore 
Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 504 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[N]onfunctionality, secondary meaning, and 
the likelihood of confusion . . . are elements of a trade-dress infringement claim, not defenses 
to such a claim.”). 
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uct design are primarily non-functional; and (3) the product design is inherently 
distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning.”79 Thus, because it is one of the 
elements of the prima facie case, the issue of functionality will often be disput-
ed during a trade dress infringement action. As part of the plaintiff’s prima fa-
cie case, “the person who asserts trade dress protection [for an unregistered 
mark] has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not 
functional.”80 For registered marks, “functionality is an affirmative defense and 
so the burden of proof rests on the defendant.”81 
II. QUESTIONING FACT FINDING 
“No one is dumb who is curious. The people who don’t ask questions remain 
clueless throughout their lives.”82 —Neil deGrasse Tyson 
 
Courts have historically decided functionality as a factual question, yet as 
examined infra, have never provided a meaningful rationale for this. This arti-
cle argues that the policy and constitutional reasons for treating it as a question 
of law—specifically as an evidentiary legal conclusion—are stronger than 
those for treating it as a factual determination. This section illustrates how there 
has never been a full, comprehensive rationale stated for determining function-
ality as a finding of fact and considers the ramifications of using this standard. 
                                                        
79  Dippin’ Dots, 369 F.3d at 1202; see also Groeneveld, 730 F.3d at 503 (“To prevail on a 
claim for the infringement of a product-design trade dress, a plaintiff must prove that its al-
legedly infringed product design (1) is nonfunctional, (2) has acquired secondary meaning, 
and (3) is confusingly similar to the allegedly infringing product design.”); Litman, supra 
note 9, at 79. (“An action for . . . trade dress infringement under section 43(a) requires alle-
gations that a competitor’s product design or packaging is likely to confuse consumers as to 
the product’s source, thus falsely designating its origin.”). 
80  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3). In 1999 the Lanham Act was amended, whereby it was clarified 
that the burden of proof for an unregistered mark fell upon the plaintiff, as part of their prima 
facie case, to proof that a trade dress was not functional: 
Section 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1125(a)) is amended by adding at 
the end the following: 
“(3) In a civil action for trade dress infringement under this Act for trade dress not regis-
tered on the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of 
proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional.” 
Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-43, 113 Stat. 220 (1999). 
81  Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 339–340 (7th Cir. 1998); see also, e.g., 
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 297 (7th Cir. 1998); Final Jury In-
structions at 85, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2011 WL 
7036077 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2012), 2012 WL 3568795 (“Apple has the burden of proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence that its unregistered trade dresses are non-functional. 
Samsung has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Apple’s regis-
tered iPhone trade dress is functional.”). 
82  Jim Clash, Neil deGrasse Tyson on Time Travel, Mars & Making Science Easy, ASKMEN, 
http://www.askmen.com/entertainment/right-stuff/neil-degrasse-tyson-interview.html (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2014). 
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A. A Finding of Fact 
A “finding of fact” is defined as a “determination by a judge, jury, or ad-
ministrative agency of a fact supported by the evidence in the record, usu. pre-
sented at the trial or hearing.”83 Whether an issue is decided as a finding of fact 
or a conclusion at law has important ramifications, including the constitutional 
right to a jury trial and standard of review prescribed to appellate courts re-
viewing the decision. 
First, under the Seventh Amendment, for a question of fact, the parties 
have a right to have the issue tried before a jury.84 “Since Justice Story’s day, 
we have understood that ‘the right of trial by jury thus preserved is the right 
which existed under the English common law when the Amendment was 
adopted.’ ”85 Questions of law, on the other hand, exist where there is a contro-
versy concerning the application of law to a set of facts,86 and are resolved by 
the court.87 For the question of determining trademark functionality, the real 
question of law to be answered is whether the feature at issue is one that falls 
under the purview of patent law. 
A second consequence of the fact-law distinction involves the appellate re-
view. Questions of fact are reviewed via a “clearly erroneous” standard,88 
which does not allow an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the 
jury or finder of fact.89 However, when a trial court has made a determination 
as a conclusion at law, the appellate court reviews the decision de novo.90 
                                                        
83  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (9th ed. 2009); see also Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Ju-
ry Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1869–70 (1966) (“When 
there is a dispute as to what acts or events have actually occurred . . . the jury has the task of 
resolving the conflict. Its role is to evaluate the evidence and to reconstruct what took place, 
as it would have appeared to an objective on-the-scene observer.”). 
84  U.S. CONST. amend. VII. (“In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”). 
85  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (internal citations 
omitted). 
86  See Weiner, supra note 83, at 1871 (“[T]he court will have to identify the broad princi-
ples by which the parties’ conduct is to be judged.”). 
87  See, Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact Under the Seventh 
Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1127–28 (2003). 
88  FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the 
trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”); see also Weiner, supra note 
83, at 1867. 
89  See, e.g., United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682, 695 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Factual findings 
are reviewed for clear error, and this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the dis-
trict court if there is support in the record for the trial court’s findings of fact.”) (citations 
omitted). 
90  See McMonagle v. Ne. Women’s Ctr., Inc., 493 U.S. 901, 904 (1989) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that findings of fact are reviewable under the “clearly erroneous” standard, 
while conclusions of law are reviewed de novo). 
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B. The Conclusory Restatement and Treatise 
There is very little evidence supporting the decision to treat functionality 
as a finding of fact.91 First, Francis H. Bohlen, the Reporter for the First Re-
statement of Torts,92 states in Section 742, Comment a: “The determination of 
whether or not such features are functional depends upon the question of fact 
whether prohibition of imitation by others will deprive the others of something 
which will substantially hinder them in competition.”93 This comment is based 
on a concept of functionality that was rejected by the Supreme Court in TrafFix 
Devices.94 Indeed, this comment did not survive the section’s transfer to the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition;95 its continued reliance should be 
questioned. The lower courts that rely on the Restatement, discussed infra, are 
basing their treatment of functionality on a faulty foundation. 
Furthermore, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition is conclu-
sory in its declaration. Without elaborating as to policy reasons or rationales 
(probably because none exist) the treatise states nothing more than that “[a]ll 
courts have held that the enquiry as to functionality is a question of fact. This 
means that on appeal in the federal courts, a finding on functionality is not be 
to [sic] reversed unless found to be ‘clearly erroneous.’ ”96 There is no com-
mentary or rationale for McCarthy’s statements, other than the outdated reli-
ance on the Restatement (First) of Torts. 
C. Inwood Labs & Morton-Norwich 
Courts have stated that the functionality of trade dress is a question of fact, 
yet none has ever explained why this is so, or when it has, it has been a superfi-
                                                        
91  Professor Mark Lemley recently published a similar finding concerning patents, noting 
that: 
[W]hile the right to a jury trial on patent validity issues is widely assumed, there is in fact no 
solid support in modern case law for such a right. The one case to hold that there was such a 
right, the Federal Circuit panel opinion in In re Lockwood, drew a sharp dissent from three 
members of the appellate court, was taken on certiorari by the Supreme Court, and was then va-
cated by that Court after the patentee withdrew its jury trial demand rather than face Supreme 
Court review. Nonetheless, both courts and lawyers have based two decades of practice on that 
uncertain foundation. The resulting practice is a hybrid one that is hard to link to any historical 
practice. 
Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1675–
76 (2013) (citations omitted). 
92  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS intro. (1934). 
93  Id. at § 742 cmt. a (1938). 
94  TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 32–33 (2001). 
95  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. a (1995). No explanation could 
be found in the record for its removal. 
96  1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:71 
(4th ed. 2014). 
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cial discourse.97 The closest that courts come to any rationale is reliance on an 
outdated Restatement. While not directly addressing trade dress functionality as 
a finding of fact, Supreme Court alluded to its support of the “finding of fact” 
standard in Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs.98 The Court held that the Second Circuit 
had either disregarded or ignored the district court’s “express finding that, for 
purposes of § 43(a), the capsule colors [at issue] were functional. . . . [T]he 
Court of Appeals’ majority either disregarded the District Court’s finding of 
functionality, or implicitly rejected that finding as not persuasive.”99 In revers-
ing the Second Circuit, Justice O’Connor, writing for a unanimous court,100 
held that “[t]he appellate court was not entitled simply to disregard the District 
Court’s finding of functionality. . . . By establishing to the District Court’s sat-
isfaction that uniform capsule colors served a functional purpose, the petition-
ers offered a legitimate reason for producing an imitative product.”101 
Thus, while the Supreme Court’s conclusory statement in Inwood Labs re-
ally does not state what kind of question functionality is (leaving it open to 
make a definitive statement without necessarily reversing itself), the Court 
strongly implies that it was proper for district courts to determine trade dress 
functionality as a finding of fact, and as such appellate courts are to review 
these findings on a “clearly erroneous” standard.102 The rationale for its posi-
tion, however, is never explained—by either it or any lower court.103 
In In re Morton-Norwich, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ap-
pears to refer to a rationale stating “ ‘functionality’ is a question of fact.”104 The 
court cites to its previous decision, In re Hollaender Manufacturing Co.,105 
which in turn relies on the since-removed language from the Restatement 
(First) of Torts.106 
                                                        
97  See infra Part II.D. 
98  Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 857 n.20 (1982). 
99  Id. (citing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 638 F.2d at 545 n.1 (2d. Cir. 1981) 
(Mulligan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
100  With separate concurrences by Justices White and Rehnquist regarding contributory in-
fringement. Id. at 846, 859, 864. 
101  Id. at 858 n.20. 
102  Id. (stating that the appellate court was not “entitled simply to dismiss the District 
Court’s finding of functionality as not ‘persuasive.’ If the District Court erred as a matter of 
law, the Court of Appeals should have identified the District Court’s legal error. If the Court 
of Appeals disagreed with the District Court’s factual findings, it should not have dismissed 
them without finding them clearly erroneous.”). 
103  See infra Part II.D. 
104  In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340 (C.C.P.A. 1982). As noted by 
Professor Mark McKenna, “TrafFix was a response to the Morton-Norwich ‘need to copy’ 
view of functionality.” McKenna, supra note 1, at 827. 
105  In re Hollaender Mfg. Co., 511 F.2d 1186, 1188–89 (C.C.P.A. 1975). 
106  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 742 (1938). Observe supra how this has since been 
removed from later editions of the Restatement, thus calling its continued reliance into ques-
tion. 
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When federal trademark rights have been sought for functional subject mat-
ter disclosed in a utility patent, the decisions of this court . . . indicate that the 
acquisition of such rights will not be allowed in view of the overriding public 
policy of preventing their monopolization, of preserving the public right to copy. 
These decisions turned upon the question whether or not the subject matter, for 
which federal trademark protection was sought, was of a functional nature, i.e., 
in essence utilitarian or dictated for reasons of engineering efficiency. The utili-
ty patent present in each of those cases was used as evidence of the functionality 
of the involved subject matter.107 
Yet, as discussed in Part IV, this same rationale can be used to instead support 
determining functionality—based on its constitutional foundation—as an evi-
dentiary conclusion of law.108 
D. Circuits in Parallel 
As noted supra, an examination of trade dress functionality case law 
among the circuits revealed that, while each circuit determines functionality as 
a finding of fact, no panel or judge provided a policy reason or other basis for 
this. One of the few decisions in which the First Circuit has addressed its use of 
the “finding of fact” for determining trade dress functionality is Mark Bric Dis-
play Corporation v. Joseph Struhl Company.109 This unreported case provides a 
conclusory statement that “there is at least a question of fact as to whether the 
trade dress is ‘essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the 
cost or quality of the article.’ ”110 The court cites to TrafFix Devices,111 for the 
substance of the inquiry, but the First Circuit’s decision to determine this as a 
finding of fact is entirely its own. 
The Second Circuit seems to rely on a vague sentence in Ives Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Darby Drug Co.112 as support for functionality as a finding of fact. That 
oft cited section for this determination merely states that “[t]he case for func-
tionality . . . depends on the evidence proffered by defendants that copying 
whatever colors Ives had chosen served a number of utilitarian purposes essen-
tial to effective competition.”113 Even though this statement could just as easily 
be interpreted as support for treating functionality as an evidentiary conclusion 
at law, the Second Circuit instead uses the sentence to leap to the same conclu-
sion reached by the Ninth Circuit when it relied on Ives in Vuitton et Fils S.A. 
v. J. Young Enterprises to pronounce that “[t]he issue of functionality has been 
                                                        
107  Hollaender, 511 F.2d at 1188 (quoting In re Honeywell, 497 F.2d 1344, 1348 (C.C.P.A. 
1974)) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
108  See infra Part IV.A. 
109  Mark Bric Display Corp. v. Joseph Struhl Co., No. C.A. 98-532ML, 2003 WL 21696318 
(D.R.I. July 9, 2003). 
110  Id. at *6 (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001)). 
111  TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001). 
112  Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979). 
113  Id. at 643. 
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consistently treated as a question of fact.”114 The Second Circuit relies on this 
conclusory, yet questionable, sentence going forward in such cases as Le-
Sportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp.115 and Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy In-
dustries Corp.116 
In the Third Circuit, Judge Higginbotham’s opinion in Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. 
Bolar Pharmacuticals Co.117 relies on the unsupported, conclusory statement 
made in Inwood Labs in holding that a “finding of nonfunctionality [sic] is a 
finding of fact.”118 Very recently, the Fourth Circuit made its first statement on 
this matter. In McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., the appellate panel 
noted that “[f]unctionality . . . is a question of fact that, like other factual ques-
tions, is generally put to a jury.”119 In her pronouncement, Judge Duncan (writ-
ing for a unanimous panel)—like many before her—relied on other circuit 
courts’ conclusory statements.120 
The Fifth Circuit uses the circular argument that “the issue of functionality 
has consistently been treated as a question of fact” by wrapping through several 
decisions containing this conclusory statement until landing onto Vuitton.121 In 
Ferrari v. Roberts,122 the Sixth Circuit states that “[f]unctionality is a factual 
determination reviewed only for clear error,”123 relying on the Second Circuit’s 
conclusory statement in LeSportsac.124 
The Seventh Circuit comes closest to stating a reason for determining func-
tionality as a finding of fact. In Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus-
                                                        
114  Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 775 (9th Cir. 1981). 
115  LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1985). 
116  Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 1002 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(“Whether a trade dress is or is not functional is a question of fact disturbed on appeal only if 
clearly erroneous.”) (citing LeSportsac, 754 F. 2d at 77). 
117  Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 747 F.2d 844, 850 (3d Cir. 1984). 
118  Id. 
119  McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 756 F.3d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 2014). 
120  Judge Duncan relies on unsubstantiated statements in the cases of In re Becton, Dickin-
son & Co., 675 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012) and Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters 
Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). Everyone seems to be relying on someone else, 
without ever providing a reason other than “well, that’s what everyone else is doing.” There 
is no actual rationale ever provided, by anyone. 
121  See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 537 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The func-
tionality, distinctiveness, or secondary meaning of a mark or trade dress and the existence of 
a likelihood of confusion are questions of fact.”) (citing Epic Metals Corp. v. Souliere, 99 
F.3d 1034, 1037 (11th Cir. 1996)). Epic Metals quotes John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke 
Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 982 (11th Cir. 1983) (“The issue of functionality has been con-
sistently treated as a question of fact.”). Harland relies on Vuitton. Every decision found re-
lies on a previous declaration, but no one discusses the reasons for functionality to be deter-
mined as a finding of fact. 
122  Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1246 (6th Cir. 1991). 
123  Id. 
124  LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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tries, L.P.125 the court asserts that “ ‘[f]unctionality’ certainly isn’t an issue of 
law; it represents a fact-specific conclusion about whether aspects of a design 
are ‘essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quali-
ty of the article.’ ”126 
The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that functionality is a finding of fact goes 
back to its reliance on the questionable sentence in Ives Labs,127 which it trans-
formed from a persuasive cite into its own holding in Vuitton.128 The Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits provide similarly conclusory statements regarding functional-
ity as a finding of fact.129 The Federal Circuit and the Trademark Trial and Ap-
peal Board have likewise used merely conclusory statements to support their 
appellate review of functionality as a question of fact.130 
III. IT’S PATENTLY OBVIOUS 
“The great discoveries are usually obvious.”131—Philip Crosby 
 
As stated supra, using a factually based legal conclusion—similar to that 
used for finding nonobviousness in patent law—is the proper standard for de-
termining non-functionality and should be adopted by the courts. This section 
provides a constitutional rationale, while the section which follows discusses 
public policy arguments for determining functionality as an evidentiary conclu-
sion at law. 
A constitutional basis for treating a question of functionality as an issue at 
law, resulting in an evidentiary conclusion at law, is founded in the following 
                                                        
125  Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus., 616 F.3d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 2010). 
126  Id. (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)); see 
also Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 647 F.3d 723, 727, 732 
(7th Cir. 2011) (holding functionality is an issue of fact that can be found on summary 
judgment; affirmed summary judgment that a product design was functional). 
127  Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 643 (2d Cir. 1979). 
128  Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 775 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The issue of 
functionality has been consistently treated as a question of fact.”); see also Vision Sports, 
Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 614 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Functionality is a question of 
fact, reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.”). 
129  See, e.g., Epic Metals Corp. v. Souliere, 99 F.3d 1034, 1037 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The issue 
of functionality is a question of fact.”); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 
520 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Whether a product feature is functional is a factual finding and is 
therefore reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.”). 
130  See, e.g., Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(“Functionality is a question of fact.”) (construing In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 
F.2d 1332, 1340 (C.C.P.A. 1982)); In re Am. Nat’l Can Co., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841, 
1843 (T.T.A.B. 1997) (“The determination of functionality is a question of fact.”) (citing J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7.26[3][c] at 7-125 (3d ed. 
1992)). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has also voiced its opinion that function-
ality is a question of fact. See Sparklets Corp. v. Walter Kidde Sales Co., 104 F.2d 396, 399 
(C.C.P.A. 1939) (“Whether the . . . feature did have utility is a question of fact.”). 
131  PHILIP B. CROSBY, THE ETERNALLY SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATION 30 (1988). 
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premise: what courts are really trying to resolve with the question of function-
ality is whether this feature is something that should be governed by patent law. 
And, in many ways, non-functionality closely resembles patent law’s obvious-
ness standard, for which courts make an evidentiary legal conclusion based on 
the underlying facts. As such, this section also analogizes the current standard 
for determining obviousness in patent law with the trademark functionality 
doctrine. 
A. Relative Obviousness 
The Supreme Court has specifically rejected determining patent validity 
with regard to obviousness as a “finding of fact” because “[t]he standard of pa-
tentability is a constitutional standard; and the question of validity of a patent is 
a question of law.”132 In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket 
Equipment Corp., the Court stated that it had previously held that: 
[T]his Court will not disturb a finding of invention made by two lower courts, in 
absence of a very obvious and exceptional showing of error. That rule, imported 
from other fields, never had a place in patent law. Having served its purpose in 
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., it is now in substance re-
jected. The Court now recognizes what has long been apparent in our cases: that 
it is the “standard of invention” that controls. That is present in every case where 
the validity of a patent is in issue. It is that question which the Court must de-
cide. No “finding of fact” can be a substitute for it in any case. The question of 
invention goes back to the constitutional standard in every case. We speak with 
final authority on that constitutional issue as we do on many others.133 
More recently the Supreme Court reaffirmed this in KSR International v. 
Teleflex.134 Patentability is a constitutional standard, determined as a question 
of law.135 As such, “[t]he determination of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 
                                                        
132  Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155 (1950) (citing 
Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 358 (1884)); see also Wesley A. Demory, Patent Claim 
Obviousness in Jury Trials: Where’s the Analysis?, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 449, 450 (2011) 
(summarizing that “[t]he Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. established that the 
ultimate determination as to patent obviousness is a matter of law based on four underlying 
factual inquiries. In 2007, the Court in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. reaffirmed the 
Graham analysis and the principle that obviousness is a matter of law.” (footnotes omitted)). 
Several scholars, however, have questioned whether obviousness should be treated as a 
question of law, even though the Supreme Court affirmed this standard in KSR. See, e.g., 
Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 1013–15 (2008); Michael J. Meurer & Katherine J. Strand-
burg, Patent Carrots and Sticks: A Model of Nonobviousness, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
547, 573–74 (2008). 
133  Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 155–56 (construing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. 
Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949)). 
134  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (“The ultimate judgment of ob-
viousness is a legal determination.”). 
135  See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (“While the ul-
timate question of patent validity is one of law, the § 103 condition [obviousness], which is 
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is a legal conclusion based on underlying facts.”136 And while the “underlying 
factual determinations are reviewed to ascertain whether they are supported by 
substantial evidence,”137 courts give de novo review to the legal conclusion of 
obviousness.138 
B. Functionally Obvious 
For obviousness, the ultimate conclusion is one of law, but it depends on 
underlying factual determinations. By analogizing to obviousness in patent law, 
one can argue that the evidentiary conclusions at law that are made based on a 
factual inquiry should also be the standard for trade dress functionality. After 
all, when a court is examining a feature of a trade dress to determine whether it 
is functional, what a court is really asking is whether the feature is something 
for which patent law is available. Courts have continuously held that 
“[p]rotection of functional product features is the province of patent law.”139 
Therefore, it too should be determined as a question of law. 
Using this form of inquiry would further lessen the importance of the oft-
criticized140 and somewhat discredited “competitive need” factor of Morton-
                                                                                                                                
but one of three conditions, each of which must be satisfied, lends itself to several basic fac-
tual inquiries.”); see also Joshua D. Sarnoff, Bilcare, KSR, Presumptions of Validity, Prelim-
inary Relief, and Obviousness in Patent Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 995, 1001 
(2008). Professor Sarnoff notes that novelty, enablement and written description also have 
judicial underpinnings as legal determinations. For example, in footnote 25, he notes that in 
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 1986), the 
Federal Circuit held that “[p]rior invention is a question of law, requiring like other validity 
issues proof of the facts by clear and convincing evidence in light of the presumption of va-
lidity in 35 U.S.C. § 282.” 
136  In re Arora, 369 F. App’x 120, 121 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing In re Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361, 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 17; Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 
358 (1884) (“In cases of patents for inventions, a valid defense, not given by the statute, of-
ten arises where the question is whether the thing patented amounts to a patentable inven-
tion. This being a question of law, the courts are not bound by the decision of the commis-
sioner, although he must necessarily pass upon it.”). In addition, it has been inferred that all 
inquiries into patent validity—including novelty and usefulness—should be determined as 
conclusions at law. See Lemley, supra note 91, at 1712. 
137  In re Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., 
Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Obviousness is a question of law, reviewed de 
novo, based upon underlying factual questions which are reviewed for clear error following a 
bench trial.”). 
138  Kumar, 418 F.3d at 1365; see also Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 719 
F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“On appeal from a bench trial on obviousness, we review 
de novo the court’s the [sic] ultimate legal conclusion of whether a claimed invention would 
have been obvious, and review the underlying findings of fact for clear error.”); Pregis Corp. 
v. Kappos, 700 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“This court reviews a jury’s conclusions 
on obviousness de novo, and the underlying findings of fact, whether explicit or implicit in 
the verdict, for substantial evidence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
139  Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2002). 
140  See generally McKenna, supra note 1. 
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Norwich,141 and rely more heavily on a query focusing on whether the feature 
in question is one which “is the province of patent law.”142 If functionality were 
primarily about competitive need—the now-rejected holding in Morton-
Norwich—then it would be more of a factual inquiry. The Supreme Court, in 
rejecting the “competitive need” view of functionality in TrafFix Devices, stat-
ed that functionality “is not simply about competitive need for product features; 
it is also, even primarily, intended to police the boundary between trademark 
and patent law by channeling protection of useful product features exclusively 
to the patent system.”143 
Courts could analogize utility patents to utilitarian functionality, and de-
sign patents for aesthetic functionality. However, a court determining function-
ality using this analogy would not address whether the product’s features are 
actually patentable, only whether they are the kind of thing for which patent 
law is available generally—even if these features are, for example, obvious. 
Even the Reporter’s note in the Restatement (First) of Torts—in spite of its 
“finding of fact” conclusory statement144—can be interpreted to support this 
new standard for determining trademark functionality, through his insinuation 
that a non-functional feature is one that does not affect the actual performance 
of the product: 
A feature is non-functional if, when omitted, nothing of substantial value in the 
goods is lost. A feature which merely associates goods with a particular source 
may be, like a trade-mark or trade name, a substantial factor in increasing the 
marketability of the goods. But if that is the entire significance of the feature, it 
is non-functional; for its value then lies only in the demand for goods associated 
with a particular source rather than for goods of a particular design.145 
Features that affect the performance of a product—one form of functionality—
are generally governed by patent law. The Reporter’s comment regarding fea-
tures that affect the functioning of an object goes to the heart of defining an in-
vention and thus what is covered under patent law. 
Both utilitarian and aesthetic functionality can be determined on the basis 
of whether the features in question should be subject to patent law. The analogy 
between utilitarian functionality and utility patents is almost too obvious. As 
noted supra, one of the major factors in determining utilitarian functionality of 
a trade dress is whether the feature was the subject of a patent.146 Aesthetic 
functionality can be correlated to design patents: patent protection for designs 
extends to “any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufac-
                                                        
141  In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
142  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164–65 (1995). 
143  McKenna, supra note 1, at 827–28. 
144  See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
145  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 742 cmt. a (1938). 
146  TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28–30 (2001). 
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ture.”147 Indeed, under the current system, a design patent’s focus is solely on 
the aesthetic and ornamental aspects of the design.148 As noted by Professor 
McKenna: 
[I]t is important to recognize that features can serve at least two different types 
of functions—they may play a role in the product’s utilitarian performance, 
making it work better for its intended use, or they may play a role in meeting 
consumer expectations. It makes sense to differentiate these types of functionali-
ty because they interact with patent law in different ways: features related to 
mechanical function implicate a concern about overlap with the utility patent 
system, while features needed because of consumer expectations do not. The lat-
ter type of features, however, which might include color and shape, might well 
be features subject to design patent protection.149 
C. Factual Inquiries as Issues at Law 
Reaching a legal conclusion based on underlying facts is nothing new in 
patent litigation. Courts have already learned how to use factual inquiries to 
reach an evidentiary conclusion at law. Indeed, in Graham v. John Deere, the 
Supreme Court resolved this paradox of using facts to reach a legal conclusion: 
While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, the § 103 condition, 
which is but one of three conditions, each of which must be satisfied, lends itself 
to several basic factual inquiries. Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior 
art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue 
are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. 
Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject mat-
ter is determined.150 
                                                        
147  35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2012). 
148  See, e.g., Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 648 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[I]f functional 
matter not protected by a utility patent is available for all to copy, then it follows that orna-
mental or aesthetic designs not protected by design patents are also free for everyone to 
copy.”); Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 939 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Utility pa-
tents afford protection for the mechanical structure and function of an invention whereas de-
sign patent protection concerns the ornamental or aesthetic features of a design.”); Warbern 
Packaging Indus., Inc. v. Cut Rate Plastic Hangers, Inc. 652 F.2d 987, 988 n.1 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(“A design patent has been defined to include an article that is ornamental, a product of aes-
thetic skill and artistic conception.”); see also Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Progress and Competition in Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 45 (2013). For a discussion 
on some of the issues plaguing aesthetic functionality, including the lack of any “right to 
copy” view that the Supreme Court states in TrafFix Devices, see McKenna, supra note 1, at 
848. 
149  McKenna, supra note 1, at 854. 
150  Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (citations omitted); see 
also Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242–43 (2011) (holding that “the 
ultimate question of patent validity is one of law”); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dick-
inson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Although the ultimate determination of 
obviousness under § 103 is a question of law, it is based on several underlying factual find-
ings . . . . When a party appeals a jury verdict of nonobviousness, we first review the jury’s 
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The Supreme Court also recognized that with factual inquiries, there will 
be problems in their application. “What is obvious is not a question upon which 
there is likely to be uniformity of thought in every given factual context. The 
difficulties, however, are comparable to those encountered daily by the courts 
. . . and should be amenable to a case-by-case development.”151 But the Court 
believed that this would lead to the “uniformity and definiteness which Con-
gress called for in the 1952 Act.”152 
When a jury is charged with determining non-obviousness, it is merely an 
advisory jury, whereby the jury is given a legal issue to decide, but the “ulti-
mate determination is reserved for the court.”153 While a judge is free to submit 
legal issues to a jury (provided they are accompanied by appropriate instruc-
tions on the law), “[t]here is no question that the judge must remain the ulti-
mate arbiter on the question of obviousness.”154 
Tests for non-obviousness are constantly examined and refined by the 
courts.155 In 2007, the Supreme Court again attempted to give guidance to a de-
termination of obviousness in KSR International v. Teleflex.156 Likewise, there 
are difficulties with the current functionality tests of Morton-Norwich,157 
Qualitex158 and TrafFix Devices.159 But regardless of the test, this does not pre-
clude these factual inquiries from being resolved as evidentiary conclusions of 
law, as patentability issues currently are. 
IV. UNDEVELOPED FUNCTIONALITY 
Now, jurymen, hear my advice— 
All kinds of vulgar prejudice 
I pray you set aside: 
With stern judicial frame of mind, 
From bias free of every kind, 
This trial must be tried!160 
—William Gilbert 
                                                                                                                                
underlying factual findings for substantive evidence. After conducting this review, we inde-
pendently review the district court’s legal conclusion on obviousness.” (citations omitted)). 
151  Graham, 383 U.S. at 18. 
152  Id. 
153  Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
154  Id. at 1358–59 (quoting R.R. Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1515 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984)). 
155  C.f. Richard L. Robbins, Note, Subtests of “Nonobviousness”: A Nontechnical Approach 
to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1169–70 (1964). 
156  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007). 
157  In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340–41 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
158  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164–70 (1995). 
159  TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29–33 (2001). 
160  Athur Sullivan & W.S. Gilbert, Trial by Jury (originally performed 1875), reprinted in 
PERCY FITZGERALD, THE OPERAS OF GILBERT AND SULLIVAN 23, 24 (1894). 
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This section first briefly discusses the basic public policy which deems that 
indefinite monopolies over useful articles are not in the public interest. It then 
asserts two policy reasons for changing the determination of functionality to an 
evidentiary conclusion at law. The first relates to several basic difficulties faced 
when juries try to make a functionality determination for trade dress, including 
poorly drafted instructions and a lack of understanding of functionality by the 
jury. Second, the “black box” of a jury does not provide a rationale for its deci-
sion, increasing the likelihood of appeal, and doing nothing to develop a robust 
functionality doctrine for the courts to follow. 
A. Limiting Monopolies 
The courts and Congress have reiterated that a monopoly over functional 
features is to be limited. As noted supra, this has a constitutional basis. 
[T]he public policy underlying the functionality doctrine . . . is to channel the 
legal protection of useful designs from the realm of trademark to that of patent. 
Such channeling ensures that the high public costs of monopoly are not imposed 
without an assurance that the design satisfies the rigorous requirements of pa-
tentability, including novelty and nonobviousness, and is protected for only a 
limited period of time.161 
In Groeneveld Transport v. Lubecore, the Sixth Circuit affirms the public 
policy declared by the Supreme Court in Qualitex: “If a product’s functional 
features could be used as trademarks . . . a monopoly over such features could 
be obtained without regard to whether they qualify as patents and could be ex-
tended forever.”162 “Were the law otherwise, it would be possible for a manu-
facturer or dealer, who is unable to secure a patent on his product or on his de-
sign, to obtain a monopoly on an unpatentable device by registering it as a 
trade-mark.”163 
Indeed, as noted by Professors McKenna and Strandburg, trademark law 
“subordinates its own policy goals to the dynamic competition goals of utility 
patent law, reserving to utility patent the responsibility for determining the cir-
cumstances under which utilitarian features may be copied by others”164 in 
what they term the “patent law supremacy” principle.165 The authors’ hierarchy 
                                                        
161  Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 508 (6th Cir. 
2013). 
162  Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164–65 (1995); see also Alan Wood 
Steel Co. v. Watson, 150 F. Supp. 861, 862 (D.D.C. 1957) (“The potential consequences to 
the public might be very serious, because while a patent is issued for only a limited term, a 
trade-mark becomes the permanent property of its owner and secures for him a monopoly in 
perpetuity.”). 
163  Alan Wood Steel Co., 150 F. Supp. at 862. 
164  McKenna & Strandburg, supra note 148, at 19. 
165  Id. at 18–19. 
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gives supremacy to the regime with the shortest monopoly (patents), and at the 
bottom of the list,166 that form which is subordinate to the others (i.e., has an 
indefinite term167) yields to the others. 
This public policy for not allowing perpetual trademark protection—and 
thus an indefinite monopoly over functional features—circles back to discus-
sion in Part III supra. And, as discussed supra, because patent validity is a con-
stitutional foundation for allowing monopolies over functional features only for 
a limited time, and only as a grant of this monopolistic right from the U.S. 
Government, this should be treated as an issue at law. 
B. Difficult Instructions, Confused Jurors 
There are several problems when complex issues such as functionality are 
left in the hands of a jury. First, jury instructions have been known to mix up 
utilitarian and aesthetic functionality and include elements from both tests into 
a single analysis, rather than considering them as two separate forms of func-
tionality.168 As discussed supra, each type has unique factors to consider that, if 
applied to the other type of functionality, could lead to an incorrect conclusion. 
Second, instructions may have juries erroneously including product elements 
that should not be considered in a functionality analysis or misstate the law. 
For example, during the trademark infringement action brought by 
Groeneveld Transport Efficiency against Lubecore International (regarding the 
trade dress of a grease pump), the trial court’s confused instructions regarding 
functionality had the jurors considering not just the appearance of the pump’s 
trade dress external shape and appearance, but also the logo and color of the 
pump, even though the pump’s trade dress did not include the latter two 
items.169 In addition, “the District Court’s instruction mixed elements of the 
definition of functionality embraced by the Supreme Court in TrafFix with 
considerations of competitive need that are irrelevant in a case of mechanical 
functionality.”170 In addition, the District Court’s instructions included apply-
ing the “non-reputation-related disadvantage” test, which is used in cases of 
                                                        
166  See id. at 19. 
167  Ownership in a mark is perpetual, as long as the owner continues to use the mark in 
commerce as a source indicator, and does not abandon it, allow it to become generic, assigns 
it in gross or allows for naked licensing. 
168  See supra notes 40–80 and accompanying text. 
169  Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 502 (6th Cir. 
2013) (“Count 1 was subsequently submitted to the jury in the form of . . . three interrogato-
ries, which track the three elements of a trade-dress claim: 1. Do you find that Plaintiff 
Groeneveld proved by a preponderance of the evidence that its Trade Dress (the external 
shape and appearance of the pump, including logo and color) are non-functional?”); see also 
Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors in Support of Appellant Lubecore 
Int’l, Inc. and Reversal at 3–4, Groeneveld, 730 F.3d 494. 
170  Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 169, at 4. 
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aesthetic functionality, not utilitarian functionality.171 Thus, jury instructions 
that confuse the tests for aesthetic and utility functionality, lead to an appellate 
decision that remands the case to the lower court for a new factual determina-
tion, or for a factual finding by the appellate court based on the correct instruc-
tions, on review of a Judgment as a Matter of Law (“JMOL”).172 
The Apple v. Samsung litigation similarly illustrates the problem of trying 
to provide adequate instructions to the jury and using the incorrect test for non-
functionality. First, the length (109 pages) of the jury instructions show that at-
tempting to “teach” the jurors can create an unwieldy burden on both the court 
and the jurors. Second, with regard to the section on trade dress dilution and 
infringement, the jury instructions regarding trade dress non-functionality in-
clude the discredited Morton-Norwich factor of the availability of alternative 
designs.173 Finally, the court’s instructions incorrectly inform the jury that “the 
fact that the feature contributes to consumer appeal and saleability of the prod-
uct does not mean that the trade dress is necessarily functional,”174 precluding 
any possibility of a finding of aesthetic functionality. In addition, Judge Koh’s 
verbal instructions fail to adequately instruct the jurors, despite Judge Koh’s 
statement in the Preliminary Jury Instructions provided at the beginning of the 
trial that she “will explain what a trade dress is.”175 
                                                        
171  Id. at 5–6; see also Groeneveld, 730 F.3d at 506 (“Discussing trademarks, we have 
said[,] in general terms, a product feature is functional, and cannot serve as a trademark, if it 
is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article. 
Expanding upon the meaning of this phrase, we have observed that a functional feature is 
one the exclusive use of which would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage. The Court of Appeals [in TrafFix Devices, reversed by the Supreme Court] 
seemed to interpret this language to mean that a necessary test for functionality is whether 
the particular product configuration is a competitive necessity. This was incorrect as a com-
prehensive definition. As explained in [Qualitex and Inwood Labs], a feature is also func-
tional when it is essential to the use or purpose of the device or when it affects the cost or 
quality of the device. . . . Where the design is functional under the Inwood formulation there 
is no need to proceed further to consider if there is a competitive necessity for the feature.” 
(quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32–33 (2001))). 
172  See infra Part IV.C. 
173  Final Jury Instructions at 84, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-
LHK, 2011 WL 7036077 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2012), 2012 WL 3568795 (“2. Availability of 
Alternate Designs. In considering this factor, you may examine whether an alternate design 
could have been used, so that competition in the market for that type of product would not be 
hindered by allowing only one person to exclusively use the particular design or configura-
tion. For this to be answered in the affirmative, the alternatives must be more than merely 
theoretical or speculative. They must be commercially feasible. The unavailability of a suffi-
cient number of alternate designs weighs in favor of finding the design or feature is func-
tional.”). 
174  Id. 
175  Preliminary Jury Instructions at 23, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-
01846-LHK, 2011 WL 7036077 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012), 2012 WL 3204612. Judge Koh 
first states, “Ladies and gentlemen: You are now the jury in this case. It is my duty to in-
struct you on the law. These instructions are preliminary instructions to help you understand 
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“[T]he line between ‘fact’ and ‘law’ in many trademark claims . . . is some-
times a fuzzy one, and the demarcation between them is made even more diffi-
cult by ill-defined statutory terms.”176 Dealing with these difficulties place ju-
rors in an untenable situation, especially with regard to functionality, where the 
jury is attempting to draw the line between patent law and trademark law. 
“[J]urors are at a serious disadvantage in their decision-making due to a paucity 
of important information.”177 The decision has a critical impact on what works 
are created in the future, and whether innovation will be hindered, stifled, or 
encouraged.178 
Yet, even the most well-conceived, thorough instructions fail in a large 
manner, because factual inquiries by a jury do nothing to provide a rationale for 
the jury’s findings. The jurors are merely responding “Yes” or “No” to a series 
of questions and no explanation is required, expected, or even desired by the 
court.179 Yet, again analogizing to patent validity, “rejections on obviousness 
grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there 
must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support 
the legal conclusion of obviousness.”180 Perhaps jury instructions could be 
worded in ways to mitigate this effect; however, the argument of improper jury 
instructions would be a continual source of appeal. Whether there can be a 
model jury instruction that satisfies all facets of functionality is doubtful.181 
                                                                                                                                
the principles that apply to civil trials and to help you understand the evidence as you listen 
to it.” Id. at 2. With regard to trade dress non-functionality, she instructs the jurors: 
To help you understand the evidence that will be presented in this case, I will explain what a 
trade dress is, and I will give you a summary of the positions of the parties.  
. . . . 
A trade dress is non-functional if, taken as a whole, the collection of trade dress elements is 
not essential to the product’s use or purpose or does not affect the total cost or quality of the 
product even though certain particular elements of the trade dress may be functional. 
Id. at 24. As noted by many of the commentators, the nightmare the jury faced included 700 
specific questions, and the jury form itself was a complex 20-page form which included nu-
merous charts, as well as technical and legal jargon that the jury was all supposed to under-
stand with enough clarity to render verdicts. Cf. Nilay Patel, Apple vs. Samsung: Inside a 
Jury’s Nightmare, THE VERGE (Aug. 23, 2012, 10:31 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2012 
/8/23/3260463/apple-samsung-jury-verdict-form-nightmare. 
176  David S. Welkowitz, Who Should Decide? Judges and Juries in Trademark Dilution Ac-
tions, 63 MERCER L. REV. 429, 432 (2012). 
177  Id. at 466. 
178  See Fromer & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1253 (noting that the “critical link between the 
audience for IP infringement and the types of works the law permits underscores the im-
portance of the optimal choice of audience.”). 
179  See e.g., Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 502 
(6th Cir. 2013); Demory, supra note 132, at 458–60. 
180  In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
181  One jurisdiction has created more complex jury instructions for patent validity, with spe-
cific findings of fact, along with a fairly sophisticated description of each element. See 
MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA §4.3b 
(2014). It is too early to evaluate whether this is a viable alternative for patent validity find-
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Special verdict forms may be so complex that they can lead to erroneous or in-
complete information about the law, or a tired jury, untrained in the law, may 
not understand the importance of some findings over others. A long, cumber-
some special verdict form may lead to more problems than it solves. 
Thus, the jury is limited to the instructions, the jury form, and the evidence 
presented, all mixed together in a black box to produce results with no rationale 
or reasoning. While a judge also may err, he or she has the benefit of prior case 
law, appellate review of the decision in its totality—including the jurist’s ra-
tionale and basis in the law—and, in time, a well-developed jurisprudence for 
determining functionality that would never be available to a jury would be ac-
cessible for future courts to use. 
Changing the standard to an evidentiary conclusion at law would require 
the judge to explain his or her rationale on the record.182 In KSR, the Supreme 
Court reiterated this requirement for obviousness, stating that in order to facili-
tate the appellate court’s de novo review, analysis should be made explicit.183 
Were functionality treated the same way, it could result in a fuller, deeper 
development of the doctrine and its application. 
C. Wrongful Consequences 
As noted supra, there are critical consequences stemming from whether an 
issue is decided as a finding of fact or a conclusion at law. “Juries occupy a 
special place in civil litigation. We give their decisions great deference, and 
courts often strive mightily to uphold jury verdicts.”184 But scholars have noted 
that this deference creates serious problems in intellectual property law dis-
putes, beyond the jury’s verdict.185 
Judges are often hesitant to overcome the high hurdle needed to reverse ju-
ry verdicts through JMOLs.186 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
court may “grant judgment as a matter of law when ‘a party has been fully 
heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury 
                                                                                                                                
ings of fact, or whether this can be used as a model for addressing the skimpy instructions 
currently used for trade dress functionality. 
182  See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). The Court in KSR also 
stressed that an explicit analysis for obviousness was needed in order to include non-prior art 
“information” (e.g., common sense) in its determination. Id. 
183  See Demory, supra note 132, at 460. The author argues that when judges submit the is-
sue of obvious to a jury, the court is abdicating its duty to conduct an independent analysis 
and provide a rationale for the decision, which prevents any meaningful review of the obvi-
ousness determination by the Federal Circuit. Id. 
184  Welkowitz, supra note 176, at 465–66 (footnotes omitted). 
185  See id. 
186  Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 503 (6th Cir. 
2013) (“A motion for judgment as a matter of law should be granted ‘if, under the governing 
law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.’ ”) (quoting Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)). 
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would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that 
issue.’ ”187 While an appeal of a JMOL does provide the appellate court de novo 
review,188 we should be hesitant to rely on this “fix,” and instead look to re-
solve the problem at the trial court level. Appellate courts should not have their 
docket packed with JMOL or other appeals due to juries’ inability to adequate-
ly discern the meaning of functionality, due either to their own limitations or 
incorrect jury instructions. 
On that fuzzy line between “fact” and “law,”189 these above problems with 
determining functionality as a finding of fact provide sufficient public policy 
reasons to have functionality moved to the “law” side of the line. 
V. FUNCTIONALITY AND THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT 
“The Constitution, on this hypothesis, is a mere thing of wax in the hands of the 
judiciary, which they may twist and shape into any form they please.”190  
— Thomas Jefferson 
 
Changing the functionality inquiry from a finding of fact to an evidentiary 
conclusion at law does raise Seventh Amendment concerns.191 However, there 
is no constitutional reason for holding functionality to a finding of fact. The 
Seventh Amendment provides the right to a jury trial. “In Suits at common law 
. . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall 
be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to 
the rules of the common law.”192 The Supreme Court has consistently held that 
the Constitutional right to a jury trial only applies to suits at law, not in equi-
ty.193 
[This] Court has construed [the language of the Seventh Amendment] to require 
a jury trial on the merits in those actions that are analogous to “Suits at common 
                                                        
187  Id. at 502–03 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)). 
188  Id. at 503 (“We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 50 motion de novo.”). 
189  Welkowitz, supra note 176, at 432. 
190  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 4 MEMOIRS, 
CORRESPONDENCE, AND PRIVATE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 324, 325 (Thomas Jefferson 
Randolph ed., 1829). 
191  For a general analysis on the role of judge and jury in trademark, see Welkowitz, supra 
note 176, at 432. 
192  U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
193  Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347–48 (1998) (“The Sev-
enth Amendment provides that ‘[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .’ Since Justice 
Story’s time, the Court has understood . . . [that t]he Seventh Amendment thus applies not 
only to common-law causes of action, but also to ‘actions brought to enforce statutory rights 
that are analogous to common-law causes of action ordinarily decided in English law courts 
in the late 18th century, as opposed to those customarily heard by courts of equity or admi-
ralty.’ ” (citations omitted)). 
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law.” Prior to the Amendment’s adoption, a jury trial was customary in suits 
brought in the English law courts. In contrast, those actions that are analogous to 
18th-century cases tried in courts of equity or admiralty do not require a jury tri-
al. This analysis applies not only to common-law forms of action, but also to 
causes of action created by congressional enactment.194 
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,195 the Supreme Court was faced 
with this issue when it held that claim construction was determined by a judge 
as a conclusion at law. 
In keeping with our longstanding adherence to this “historical test,” we ask, 
first, whether we are dealing with a cause of action that either was tried at law at 
the time of the founding or is at least analogous to one that was. If the action in 
question belongs in the law category, we then ask whether the particular trial 
decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-
law right as it existed in 1791.196 
As for infringement actions, “there is no dispute that infringement cases 
today must be tried to a jury, as their predecessors were more than two centu-
ries ago.”197 However, the Court held that even if an infringement action must 
be tried by a jury, there may still be particular issues within the jury trial that 
are themselves not jury issues.198 This will “depend on whether the jury must 
shoulder this responsibility as necessary to preserve the ‘substance of the 
common-law right of trial by jury.’ ”199 In establishing how to determine 
whether a jury trial was required, the Court went on to hold that “[o]nly those 
incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of the essence 
of the system of trial by jury” are bound by the Seventh Amendment.200 For pa-
tent cases, this meant that while construing patent terms was a job for the 
court,201 the infringement analysis was “a question of fact, to be submitted to a 
jury.”202 
                                                        
194  Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987) (citing Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433 
(1830)). 
195  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
196  Id. at 376 (citations omitted). 
197  Id. at 377. 
198  Id. 
199  Id. (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 426). 
Where history and precedent provide no clear answers, functional considerations also play their 
part in the choice between judge and jury to define terms of art. . . . [W]hen an issue “falls 
somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction 
at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, 
one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.” So it turns 
out here, for judges, not juries, are the better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent terms. 
Id. at 388 (citations omitted) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). 
200  Id. at 377 (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 426). 
201  Id. at 386–88 (“[I]n addressing the ultimate issue of mixed fact and law, it was for the 
court to lay down to the jury the law which should govern them. . . . Questions of construc-
tion are questions of law for the judge, not questions of fact for the jury. . . . The duty of in-
terpreting letters-patent has been committed to the courts. A patent is a legal instrument, to 
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Criticism regarding the right to a jury trial to determine patent validity—
expanding beyond obviousness determinations and claim construction—has 
recently been made by Professor Lemley.203 He describes the historical under-
pinnings of English Courts determining patent validity first by the King, then 
by Privy Council and Chancery Courts, and only in a limited capacity by ju-
ries.204 In addition, he describes how, in the United States, challenges to patent 
validity were historically determined by courts at equity, and there is ample 
support for returning all issues of validity to a judge.205 
Registration of a mark, while a less rigorous analysis than a patent prose-
cution, is subject to examination by the Patent and Trademark Office. In one of 
several arguments to support his assertion that judges, rather than juries should 
decide patent validity Professor Lemley notes: 
[W]e don’t normally ask juries to review the decision of an administrative agen-
cy . . . . The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) presupposes that judges, not 
juries, review agency decisions. The Supreme Court has held that there is no 
                                                                                                                                
be construed, like other legal instruments, according to its tenor.”) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
202  Id. at 384–85 (“The two elements of a simple patent case, construing the patent and de-
termining whether infringement occurred, were characterized by the former patent practi-
tioner, Justice Curtis. ‘The first is a question of law, to be determined by the court, constru-
ing the letters-patent, and the description of the invention and specification of claim annexed 
to them. The second is a question of fact, to be submitted to a jury.’ ”) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 338 (1853)). 
203  Lemley, supra note 91. 
204  Id. at 1680–91. The article provides English Patent Practice history regarding patent va-
lidity determinations prior to the American Revolution. Beginning in the 1500s, it was a 
grant by the King (which only he could revoke); later its adjudication was in Courts of 
Chancery, which did not have the power to convene a jury. Professor Lemley notes that 
through the 1790s, patent infringement was determined at common law—by courts of law 
with a jury—though the jury had the limited ability to find a patent invalid for that particular 
infringing action. Actions by either a Court of Chancery or the King’s Privy Council were 
necessary to universally invalidate a patent. Id. 
205  Id. at 1691–704. Professor Lemley details the history of patent validity challenges, sum-
marizing that: 
there is no such long tradition of juries deciding validity in the United States . . . for most of the 
last 150 years, including the time in which the modern requirements of validity were developed 
and applied, judges, not juries, decided those validity questions. . . . A Court concerned with 
preserving a traditional right is unlikely to find that right to exist in a practice that was uncom-
mon before 1978 and not truly prevalent until the late 1980s. 
Id. at 1724. Professor Lemley also describes another, equally important argument for trying 
patent validity in equity—that the Supreme Court sees patents as: 
rights affected with a public interest . . . [and] patent validity as a matter of public, not private 
rights. A Supreme Court focused on the public rights elements of Seventh Amendment jurispru-
dence is likely to conclude that patents are instruments of public, not private, policy to which the 
Seventh Amendment does not apply. 
Id. at 1723. Professor Lemley cites to the leading cases of Lear Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 
(1969), MedImmune, Inc. v Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) and Precision Instrument 
Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945) in support of this argument. 
Id. at 1723 & nn.237–40. 
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constitutional right to jury review of administrative agency decisions. And as the 
Supreme Court held in 1999, the PTO is an administrative agency subject to the 
normal rules of the APA.206 
However, unlike patents, rights to a mark do exist absent of registration with 
the PTO. Rather than create a dual system for registered versus unregistered 
marks, the same standard should be applied to a functionality determination, 
regardless of the status of the mark in question: that of an evidentiary conclu-
sion at law. 
Thus, during litigation, courts can divide the trade dress infringement anal-
ysis in two parts—determining infringement retains its Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury, while functionality—that is, whether this is an area of law that 
patent law should govern—can be seen as a question of law to be decided by 
the court. If a judge determines that the product feature is non-functional, then 
the issue of infringement goes to the finder of fact. 
FINAL THOUGHTS 
The functionality doctrine prevents giving non-competitive advantages to 
those designs which are either useful or aesthetically pleasing.207 Yet this really 
means that we are telling the person claiming these design features that trade-
mark law is not the area of intellectual property by which one can claim a mo-
nopoly over these features. We have given this role to patent law. 
Yet if this is what we are saying—that if you want to protect the design, 
get a patent if you can—then why is functionality determined by a different ev-
identiary standard? Consistency is the hallmark of the rule of law, and we 
should not hold a constitutional standard to different levels based on where one 
commonly assesses the issue. Merely because functionality is a determination 
in trademark law does not lessen the reality that it is actually an assessment of 
whether the feature should be governed by patent law. And there is a valid ar-
gument that there is no Seventh Amendment requirement for a jury to be the 
arbitrators of functionality. 
A shift in the standard for determining functionality of trade dress would 
benefit competitors and consumers and bring the standard in line with the 
source of the inquiry based in patent law. It would also align the review of the 
administrative decision by the trademark examiner with the requirements under 
the Administrative Procedure Act. Importantly, the shift would remove the of-
ten ill-equipped jury from making the technical determination that is necessary 
to resolve what is essentially a constitutional question, yet retain a defendant’s 
right to have a jury ultimately decide whether there has been infringement. 
                                                        
206  Id. at 1674 (citations omitted); see also In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(holding that the requirement that the rejection of a patent application be more than a con-
clusory statement “is as much rooted in the Administrative Procedure Act, which ensures 
due process and non-arbitrary decisionmaking, as it is in § 103”). 
207  See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995). 
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Even from an early age, our understanding of the physical world is built on 
the scientific inquiry of answering the question “why?” Young children pester 
their parents with questions such as, “Why is the sky blue?” “Why don’t horses 
sing?” “Why can’t I get a puppy for Christmas?” We continually look to an-
swer that elusive question of “why”? Even as children, we found the answer 
often given (or as adults, the answer we give) very unsatisfying: “Because.” So, 
we continue to look for reasons to explain the happenings around us. As adults, 
we ponder larger, more complex questions.208 We explore the universe and use 
the properties of the laws of physics to explain how the world and the universe 
work. Albert Einstein,209 Carl Sagan,210 and Cecilia Payne-Gaposchkin211 ex-
panded our understanding of the Earth and the universe with their skepticism of 
unproven but accepted theories, and instead asked—and answered—“why?” 
Likewise, we should avoid tolerating responses of “that is how it has al-
ways been done” as an acceptable answer to a legal inquiry, especially one with 
such lasting and serious repercussions. Rather, it is our duty to question these 
longstanding pronouncements, and ensure that they are, in fact, the way things 
ought to be. 
                                                        
208  Though I still want to know why horses don’t sing. 
209  Albert Einstein was a theoretical physicist best known for expanding Sir Isaac Newton’s 
theories of physics with his own theories of General Relativity and Special Relativity. See 
ROYAL SWEDISH ACAD. OF SCIENCES, SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND ON THE NOBEL PRIZE IN 
PHYSICS 2011, at 2 (2011). 
210  Carl Sagan was an astrophysicist at Cornell University, best known for being a strong 
proponent of the scientific method of discovery, scientific skeptical inquiry, and bringing an 
understanding of science to the general public. See generally David Morrison, Man for the 
Cosmos: Carl Sagan’s Life and Legacy as Scientist, Teacher, and Skeptic, SKEPTICAL 
INQUIRER, Jan./Feb. 2007, at 29, available at  http://www.csicop.org/si/show/carl_sagans 
_life_and_legacy_as_scientist_teacher_and_skeptic/. 
211  Dr. Cecilia Payne-Gaposchkin was a brilliant astrophysicist, who, in the 1920s, theorized 
the composition of stars based on their relative abundances of the two most basic chemical 
elements—hydrogen and helium. She was also the first person to earn a Ph.D. in Astronomy 
at Radcliff College. Dr. Payne-Gaposchkin was also the first woman to head a department at 
Harvard University when in 1956, she was appointed chair of its Department of Astronomy. 
See Cecilia Helena Payne-Gaposchkin, CWP AT UCLA, http://cwp.library.ucla.edu/Phase2 
/Payne-Gaposchkin,_Cecilia_Helena@861234567.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2015). 
